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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Scientific realists take science seriously. First, they take the epistemic aims of 
science seriously. For realists, the main epistemic goal of science is understanding 
the world and how it works. While instrumentalists put the emphasis on prediction 
and practical applicability, realists think that this is not enough. Science should 
also aim to explain things. Second, realists take science seriously by setting high 
standards for the ultimate evaluation of scientific claims. While social 
constructivists and other non-realists might be satisfied with the consensus of the 
relevant community, realists think that scientists should be more ambitious: they 
should attempt to get things right. For realists, most scientific claims are about 
things that exist independently of the epistemic activities of scientists. According 
to realists, scientific statements are truth-apt: it makes sense to talk about their 
truth and falsity even if the entities mentioned in such statements are about the 
unobservable. The third indication of realists taking science seriously is the 
emphasis they put on the critical evaluation of current epistemic practices. The 
explanatory goals of science and the non-epistemic notion of truth give realists the 
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standard according to which our methodological ideas should be evaluated. For a 
realist, it is entirely possible that the principles of evidential and explanatory 
reasoning employed within a scientific field are inappropriate for the goals of 
science.  
 
 
The above characterization provides the general spirit of scientific realism. When 
realists begin to articulate the details of their position, a lot of variation is 
possible. Consequently, scientific realism is not a monolithic doctrine. There are a 
number of different ways to be a scientific realist. Given this background, it is 
surprising that in the social sciences, one specific formulation of realism 
dominates the discursive landscape. This approach is called critical realism. 
While there are some differences between different advocates of critical realism, 
its central ideas and arguments derive from the early work of Roy Bhaskar (1975; 
1979), who in turn was inspired by the work of Rom Harré (1970; 1975). In 
economics the main advocate of critical realism has been Tony Lawson (1997; 
2003). Although critical realism in economics is certainly a broader movement 
with some internal doctrinal variation, we limit our discussion to its most 
important representative.  
 
 
In this paper we argue that, despite its influence, critical realism is not the most 
promising version of scientific realism for economics. The main problem with 
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critical realism is its hermetic insulation from the mainstream of the philosophy of 
science. We argue that this intellectual isolation is unfortunate, as it has meant 
that critical realism has missed many opportunities to develop its central concepts, 
such as causal mechanism, emergence, and explanation. At the same time, we 
argue, critical realists have missed some crucial aspects of the intellectual strategy 
of modern economics. Our point is not to defend mainstream economics, rather it 
is to show that a better understanding of modeling as a scientific research strategy 
opens up the possibility of a more penetrating analysis of its possible 
shortcomings.  
 
 
Critical realism certainly shares many central tenets with Mäki’s realist vision of 
economics, such as the emphasis on observer-independent truth and the 
importance of finding causal mechanisms. Yet there is a crucial difference. Uskali 
Mäki’s philosophical project has been the formulation of a form of realism which 
renders economic modeling at least potentially compatible with scientific realism, 
despite the ubiquitous idealizations and outright fictions. The introduction of 
falsities is necessary in isolating significant truths from the complexity of 
economic systems in a tractable way. Whether the resulting models actually 
manage to isolate the most important economic mechanisms in a way which 
would result in improved understanding and better tools for intervening in the 
economic reality, cannot be decided by purely philosophical argumentation. In 
contrast, the critical realist is unwilling to vindicate radical idealizations in 
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economics in this way. For the critical realist, the complexity of social life cannot 
be decomposed into manageable parts with theoretical isolations, and some other 
way of making sense of economic phenomena must therefore be found. 
But what do the critical realists have to offer as an alternative for the model-based 
strategy of mainstream economics? In our assessment, this is the most damning 
failure of critical realism as a philosophy of science: it offers very little in the 
form of positive ideas and “realistic” tools with which to correct our social 
science practices. In this paper, we will focus on the central positive critical realist 
proposal for a more fruitful economic methodology: contrastive explanation. We 
acknowledge that there are other methodological proposals, such as “iconic 
modeling” (Harré 2004: ch. 1), but we will leave these out of our discussion in 
order to reserve space for a thorough discussion of what we take to be the most 
important positive methodological suggestion, especially in the context of 
economics. We make our case by examining a recent paper by Lawson (2009a). 
In this paper, Lawson applies the conceptual apparatus of critical realism in 
general, and the idea of contrastive explanation in particular, to analyze a 
prominent example of economic reasoning: Akerlof’s celebrated paper on 
informational asymmetries, “The Market for’Lemons” (1970). We argue that a 
better analysis of the case can be made by employing ideas developed recently in 
philosophy of science. By combining some recent ideas about contrastive 
explanation with Uskali Mäki’s insights about the method of isolation, it is 
possible to obtain a better realist platform for a critical engagement with the 
economics.  
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2.  THE KEY IDEAS OF CRITICAL REALISM 
 
The critical part of critical realism stems from the conviction that epistemic 
practices should be evaluated according to whether or not they suit the nature of 
the phenomena that they are used to study. Epistemology should follow ontology. 
(Lawson 2003: 12) The central critical realist argument against mainstream 
economics can be summarized as follows. Mathematical economic model 
building is an explanatorily infertile exercise because it presupposes a 
“deductivist” model of explanation, according to which explanation amounts to 
the subsumption of individual events under occurrent event regularities (constant 
conjunctions and correlations between observed phenomena). The existence of 
such event regularities requires that the system is closed, that is, that the causal 
powers of the entities composing the system act “atomistically,” and that the 
system itself is suitably shielded from outside disturbances. However, social 
systems in general and economic systems in particular are neither atomistic nor 
closed, hence the model-based mainstream project is doomed to failure. (Lawson 
1997; 2003.) 
 
 
Lawson has recently emphasized that the problem with economics is not 
positivism or generally Humean metaphysics as such. He now acknowledges that 
even mainstream economists are not in fact looking for regularities in the data, but 
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rather for the causal mechanisms underlying the observed regularities and patterns 
(stylized facts, correlations between variables, etc.) (2003: 25; 2009b). This point 
has been driven home by Wade Hands, Kevin Hoover, and Jack Vromen, among 
others (Hands 1997; Hoover 2002; Vromen 2009). Even though economists seem 
to derive descriptions of regularities from the standard axioms of rational choice, 
these axioms describe the components of economic causal mechanisms. But what 
Lawson insists upon is that the “deductivist” explanatory methodology of model 
building is nevertheless ill suited for the purpose of describing causal mechanisms 
in the social realm. The argument is that every deduction within a model 
presupposes the truth of a claim about a strict event regularity: whenever the 
premises are true, then the conclusion will also be true. And this won’t work, 
because the social realm is neither atomistic nor closed (Lawson 2009b). 
 
 
A closed system is a set of entities and causal powers that is shielded from outside 
disturbances (extrinsic closure) and one that does not exhibit complex endogenous 
dynamics and novel behavior (intrinsic closure). As Nancy Cartwright (1997) has 
put it, such a closed system is a nomological machine which produces observed 
regularities. However, lawlike regularities are hard to come by in the wild, 
because their production is anything but a trivial matter. In the physical sciences, 
such closures can be achieved in the laboratory and this closure is epistemically 
useful because we can learn about the (unobserved) mechanisms and powers by 
intervening experimentally on parts of the system and then observing how the 
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observed regularities change. Closure and experimental control enable us to 
formulate “deductive” explanations: y is explained by pointing out that x and, 
ceteris paribus, whenever condition x, then consequence y invariably follows.  
 
 
The social realm is closed only in the most uncommon of situations. All social 
and economic systems are nested within and in constant contact with other social 
and economic systems. Moreover, the social world is reproduced and transformed 
by human agency, which provides the social world with unpredictable 
endogenous dynamics. Real economic agents are purposive and innovative, 
constantly exhibiting novel and unpredictable behavior. Lawson takes this 
fundamental fact to be the essence of the Lucas critique, and that it thus shows the 
a priori futility of all “deductivist” modeling, not just the project of structural 
macroeconometrics (Lawson 1997: 81-83). Spatially and temporally fleeting 
closures can occur when the social situation is highly isolated, stabilized by 
powerful external causes, and in which the viable alternative courses of actions of 
the agents are reduced to one. For example, the behavior of single agents in a 
traffic jam is relatively predictable, because the action of the agent is so highly 
constrained. Yet these situations are the extreme exception rather than the norm. 
Instances of such temporary and incomplete closures may give rise to observable 
“demi-regularities”, which can constitute important evidence for causal inquiry 
and legitimate targets for statistical techniques, but cannot as such salvage the 
feasibility of deductivist explanation (Lawson 1997: ch. 15).  
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A system is composed of atomistic causal powers if the causal powers are 
intrinsic properties of the components and if the interaction of the powers is 
separable (additive). The separability of powers eases the formulation of 
deductive explanation because the causal web can be decomposed into separate 
causal laws, according to which, whenever factor x is present, its causal 
contribution is y (Lawson 2003: 13-16). According to critical realists, the social 
realm is not atomistic, because the causal powers are relational or made up of 
“internal relations” and the consequences of their interaction are emergent. The 
fact that the social realm is constituted by internal relations is established by 
transcendental deduction: the existence of the social status of a student is a 
conceptually necessary condition for someone to be a teacher and the causal 
powers of the teacher derive from this internal relationship. These causal powers 
are not separable, because the internality of the causal relations and the creative 
aspect of human agency mean that the joint causal consequences of these powers 
are always emergent (ibid. 39-44). The social realm is something over and above 
the sum of its parts and, hence, it cannot be reduced to, or even investigated as, 
separable causal regularities. 
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Where then, lies the hope for the economist? Remember that the mainstream 
economist and the critical realist share the same goal of finding out the causal 
mechanisms behind economic phenomena. For the remainder of the paper, we 
will explore what critical realism has to offer to replace the mainstream 
“deductivist” method of explanation. We will focus on Lawson’s proposals 
concerning contrastive explanation (2003; 2009a) and compare them to the recent 
developments in the philosophy of science concerning explanation and causal 
reasoning. 
 
3.  CONTRASTIVE EXPLANATION: WHAT IT CAN AND CANNOT DO? 
 
Tony Lawson presents the idea of contrastive explanation as the explanatory 
methodology for the social sciences. Contrastive explanation makes causal 
explanation possible without relying on the false idealizations of isolative 
economic models. According to Lawson, the “methodology” of contrastive 
explanation answers three crucial challenges for causal explanation in an open and 
internally related social world that cannot be studied experimentally: (1) how to 
discover and define meaningful explananda when there are no observable event 
regularities; (2) how to formulate meaningful causal hypotheses; and (3) how to 
discriminate between alternative hypotheses about causal mechanisms (2003: 81). 
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The idea of contrastive explanation is certainly not alien to mainstream 
philosophy of science (van Fraassen 1980; Garfinkel 1981; Hesslow 1983; 
Woodward 1984; for a review see Ylikoski 2007), to philosophy of economics 
(Marchionni 2006), nor to Mäki’s version of realism (Mäki and Marchionni 
2011). Explanation relates contrasts because explanation is not achieved by 
subsuming token events under event regularities, but by exhibiting what the object 
of explanation depends on. This entails that the explanandum is always defined 
against a set of plausible alternatives and that the explanans is the factor that 
makes the difference between these alternative states of affairs. Yet the surface 
appearance of most explanations hides this contrastive structure. Most 
explanatory claims appear to be about a phenomenon, such as the level of 
unemployment, a spread in the prices of financial instruments, or the existence of 
excess demand in some market. Yet it does not really make sense to attempt to 
explain such things tout court. Akerlof’s Market for lemons does not attempt to 
explain prices as such (even in the specific market of used cars in the US used as 
“a finger exercise”), but a specific contrast between the actual price difference 
between new and used cars and what could be expected if the price reflected only 
the difference in the use value of new and used cars. One of the main functions of 
the contrastive theory of explanations is therefore the explication of what exactly 
can be explained by a given explanation (Ylikoski 2007), just as Lawson claims. 
 
 
  554	  
For Lawson, the role of contrastive explanation does not end with the contrastive 
explanandum. Contrasts do not merely explicate, but also direct explanatory 
inquiry. According to Lawson, a good explanandum is something that appears 
surprising and puzzling contrasted against the pre-theoretical expectations about 
the normal course of events. This, essentially, is the answer to the first challenge 
of social explanation: surprising contrasts pick out reasonable explananda from 
the clutter of internally related and emergent social life (such as a surprising price 
difference between brand new and only little-used cars).ii However, there are 
number of problems with Lawson’s version of the contrastive structure of causal 
inquiry. 
 
  
First, it is surprising that Lawson thinks that the idea of contrastive explanation is 
something that sets his preferred form of economic enquiry apart from 
mainstream economics. It is plausible to think that mainstream economists are 
also in the business of accounting for differences (or at least can plausibly be 
interpreted as explaining differences, see Marchionni 2006). The specificity of 
mainstream economics does not lie here, but in the kinds of contrastive 
explananda they address. For example, the central heuristic assumption that the 
rational equilibrium is inherently understandable and that the only things 
requiring additional explanation are deviations from this rational benchmark, is 
certainly a worthwhile object of critical engagement with the mainstream. In fact, 
the way in which the economic explananda are related to the assumptions of 
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economic theory might be a much more fruitful target of attention for a realist 
who is interested in critically challenging the ways of the economic discipline. 
The second problem is that Lawson curiously elevates an observation about the 
circumstances in which explanatory questions usually arise in everyday life to be 
a defining feature of all explanatory reasoning. For Lawson, contrast explanation 
– or the method of explaining critical contrasts – always addresses anomalies. It 
turns on accounting for surprising, noteworthy, inconsistent, disturbing, or 
unexpected outcomes. Surely this cannot be right. It is one of the central features 
of basic scientific research that it is also interested in explaining things that are 
usually taken for granted (Ylikoski 2007: 35-36). For example, for a theoretically 
oriented biologist, it is certainly more interesting to explain why grass is usually 
green rather than to account for those rare cases when it is not. Of course, giving 
up the idea that explanation is always the explanation of anomalies does not 
change the usefulness of contrastive ideas: the explanation of greenness is an 
explanation of why the grass is green rather than some other color. 
 
 
The third problem is that the idea of contrastive explanandum does not get us very 
far. Certainly it does not deliver all the goods Lawson seems to attribute to it. The 
philosophical literature on causal explanation has demonstrated that a mere 
reference to a mechanism or to an arbitrary segment of the causal history of an 
event is not necessarily relevant explanatorily. Happily, the idea of contrastive 
explanation provides a solution: the relevant causal information picks out the 
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factor that made the difference between the explanandum and its contrasts. This is 
the counterfactual criterion of explanatory relevance. If the explanans had been 
different, the explanandum would have been different as well. Lawson’s own 
examples also clearly point to a difference-making criterion of explanatory 
relevance: the explanation for a surprising contrast between yields of different 
pieces of farmland is the factor that made the difference between the yields 
(Lawson 2003, 88). Unfortunately Lawson’s treatment of contrastive explanation 
does not really address this crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in such 
explanations of differences and hence misses much of the epistemologically 
challenging issues of how and when such reasoning is warranted.  
As Lawson is reluctant to investigate the counterfactual nature of contrastive 
explanation further, he fails to acknowledge that the difference-making criterion 
of explanatory relevance in fact entails a (sort of) deductive constraint on 
explanation. In order for one to be in a position to assert that if the explanans had 
been different, the explanandum would have been different as well, one has to 
have knowledge of an invariance between the explanans and the explanandum, 
which enables deduction from the possible states of the explanans to possible 
states of the explanandum (Woodward 2003). To see this, consider again 
Akerlof’s explanation of the price difference between new and little-used cars. 
We can reason that the puzzling price difference depends on the information 
asymmetry because the lemons-model implies that if information about the 
quality of the traded good were equally available to buyers and sellers (they 
would have equally correct expectations about the quality), the equilibrium 
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market prices would only reflect actual quality differences in the traded products. 
This constraint does not imply that deduction is a constitutive element of 
explanatory relation (Ylikoski 2005), nor does it say anything about the alleged 
symmetry between explanation and prediction. It is certainly not necessarily 
related to a Humean conception of causality. It is simply a consequence of the fact 
that we usually represent and reason about dependencies in (propositionally 
structured) language. 
 
 
The big question, of course, is what kind of evidence justifies counterfactual 
claims required for contrastive causal explanation. Mere knowledge of regularities 
is not enough, since the counterfactual inferences are modal in that they are about 
what would have happened if, not what actually has happened or even what will 
happen. For this, we need knowledge of causes and mechanisms. 
 
4. CAUSAL INFERANCE IN AN OPEN WORLD 
 
The second challenge of causal explanation in the open and holistic social realm, 
the generation of meaningful causal hypotheses, is a tougher nut to crack. Yet 
Lawson claims that the method of contrast explanation is also a method for causal 
inference. He writes “just as an event regularity produced in the experimental 
laboratory prima facie marks the site of a single set of causal mechanisms in play, 
a surprising contrast directs us to a set of causal mechanisms” (Lawson 2003: 95). 
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Except that of course it doesn’t. This really is the central puzzle with critical 
realism: since causal mechanisms and powers are not directly observable, no 
meaningful experiments can be carried out because of the failure of atomism in 
the social realm, and statistical methods do not help because there are no 
regularities, how are we supposed to do causal inference in the social and 
economic realms? Simply naming the problematic inferential step from an 
observed effect to an unobservable cause “retroduction” is not an answer to this 
question.  
 
 
Lawson claims that there simply is no general solution to this problem, but hints 
at two principles that can lead us to the causes of observed differences: Mill’s 
method of difference and the use of explanatory power as an evidential criterion. 
The method of difference is an answer to the second challenge of causal 
explanation, namely, how to formulate hypotheses about the causes of observed 
surprising contrasts. If a good comparison case for a situation in which a 
surprising event prompts explanatory inquiry can be found, such that it differs in 
only one other respect compared to the original explanandum situation, then that 
other differing factor is a good candidate for being the causal explanation of the 
contrast. In Lawson’s example, the surprising contrast between yields of 
seemingly similar plots of land is explained by the only other observable 
difference, namely the proximity to water. In his response to Geoff Hodgson’s 
criticism (Hodgson 2009), Lawson emphasizes that non-experimental social 
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causal enquiry should aim for such “concomitant regularities,” rather than causal 
sequences of events (Lawson 2009d: 203). 
 
 
Given how keen Lawson is to point out the strict limits of applicability for formal 
modeling tools of mainstream economics, it is surprising that he does not 
recognize the severe limitations of his favored approach. Let us see where the 
problem lies. Lawson writes: 
 
  
we expect a set of outcomes to be reasonably similar because of a shared 
(recent) causal history. Now if in such a contrast space a subset of 
outcomes turns out to be systematically different from the rest, we have 
reason both to suppose that a single (set of) causal feature(s) may be 
responsible, and also anticipate that we can isolate it.  
    (Lawson 2009c: 26) 
 
 
Now, this is very optimistic. A closer look at Lawson’s proposal shows that it is a 
variation of John Stuart Mill’s difference principle (Mill [1843] 2002: 255). It also 
inherits most of the latter’s problems. The most prominent of these is the problem 
of multiple principles. It is very rare to find such natural experiments in which 
there is only one difference between the two cases one is comparing. Precisely 
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because of the “ontological nature” of economic phenomena, cases that are 
exactly alike except for the differences in the cause and effect variables, are very 
rare. It would be a remarkable stroke of luck to find two markets for used cars 
exactly alike except for the fact that in one the quality of the cars would be 
transparent to both sellers and buyers whereas in the other such information 
would be asymmetric. This sets a definite limit to the use of method of difference 
as a method of causal inference. 
 
  
This fact is obscured by Lawson’s loose way of talking about causes and causal 
mechanisms. He suggests that the controlled experiment is one way to learn about 
causal mechanisms. However, as many examples from medicine show, the 
experiment does not necessarily give us understanding of the mechanisms. It only 
tells us about causal dependencies – what can be brought about by a specified 
intervention within specific circumstances. The mechanisms underlying this 
causal invariance might remain unknown for a long time. It seems that Lawson 
has fallen victim to a common mistake: confusing the rhetorical appeal of 
mechanism talk with a substantial account of causation and causal inference.  
Nevertheless, nobody would deny that the method of difference certainly has a 
place in economic methodology. Comparative research strategies using rich 
historical case studies of economic events and institutions, possibly amended with 
techniques such as analytic narratives, are certainly powerful and under-utilized 
methods for causal inquiry in economics and Lawson is certainly right in 
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advocating a more widespread use of these strategies alongside mainstream 
econometric modeling. But these strategies do not amount to a distinct “method of 
contrastive explanation” previously overlooked in economics. There is also a 
strong econometric tradition of conceptualizing econometric modeling as the 
observational equivalent of statistical analysis of controlled experiments, which 
aims at pinpointing “natural experiments” and then statistically controlling for the 
remaining differences in units studied (e.g., Heckman 2008; Angrist and Pischke 
2009). Such econometric studies clearly do not aim at uncovering Humean event 
regularities, but at a systematic comparative study of differences with the kind of 
statistical data available to economists – a generalization of the method of 
difference. But such studies cannot be carried out without the use of mathematics. 
 
 
The second epistemic principle by which contrastive explanation can get us to 
causes is a form of inference to the best explanation. According to Lawson, the 
explanation which explains the most contrasts is the one most likely to be true 
(2003: 95; 2009a: 410). This is the way in which contrastive explanation is 
supposed to help in the third challenge of picking the right mechanistic 
hypotheses out of a set of possible causal explanations. The intuition linking the 
capacity of a hypothesis to explain much by little to the probability of the 
explanatory hypothesis is certainly common (Lipton 2004), but its validity as an 
epistemic principle is in fact highly controversial.  
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The general idea of inference to the best explanation can be understood in (at 
least) three different ways. First, a causal hypothesis which has more evidence has 
… more evidence. Having multiple empirically confirmed consequences is, 
ceteris paribus, obviously an epistemically good thing for a causal hypothesis. But 
this truism does not really give us the advantage the supporters of the inference to 
the best explanation advocate. Second, beyond the first truism, there is the idea 
that the hypothesis that best unifies the phenomena, i.e. that explains as much as 
possible by as little as possible, is the likeliest hypothesis to be true. But there is 
little evidence that Lawson would be seriously committed to unification, either as 
an account of explanation or as an evidential virtue. Moreover, the efforts to 
provide a formal explication of this intuition linking unification and truth have so 
far proven futile (see, e.g., Schupbach 2005) Therefore, if Lawson is to claim that 
contrast explanation is a method for causal inference, he must be advocating the 
third possibility, according to which explanatory virtues are a reliable guide to 
truth. In other words, the explanatory merits of a hypothesis are also evidential 
merits. There are serious problems with this idea. First, there is the thorny 
problem of justifying the assumption that the loveliness of an explanation is 
connected with its likeliness (Lipton 2004). Second, the idea of explanatory virtue 
– or “power” – is quite hazy and the supporters of the inference to the best 
explanation have not been able to give much substance to this metaphorical 
notion. A closer look at the notion of explanatory power shows that this is not a 
one-dimensional concept and these dimensions are distinct and independent from 
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evidential virtues (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). In sum, the extent to which 
“explanatory power” can be regarded as an epistemic principle is quite narrow: 
inference to the best explanation works if and only if it is interpreted as inference 
to the likeliest cause. But this just brings us back to the problem of causal 
inference. Contrastive explanation is not an independent methodology for causal 
inference. 
 
  
Lawson’s advocacy of his preferred forms of causal reasoning is indicative of 
how far-reaching methodological proclamations he is willing to make based on a 
priori philosophical argument. This distinguishes his critical realism from Mäki’s 
brand of cautious realism. Yet we take Lawson’s optimism concerning the 
reliability of informal causal reasoning in the social realm to be a cautionary 
example of the dangers of such philosophizing. One of the sources of Lawson’s 
unwarranted optimism concerning the ease of causal reasoning is the peculiar 
habit of conflating natural and conceptual dependency, which is characteristic of 
critical realism in general. Although the general idea that the causal relation is to 
be characterized in terms of necessity dates back to Hume and beyond, the 
specific idea that de re natural necessity of causation is transformed to conceptual 
necessity in the process of scientific concept formation comes from Rom Harré 
and Edward Madden. According to Harré and Madden (1975), successful concept 
formation defines theoretical entities according to their causal powers. Thus it is 
in the very definition of protonhood that a proton attracts negatively charged 
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particles and if a particular particle fails to have this property, it simply cannot be 
a proton. Therefore the causal necessitation between a proton and movements of 
negatively charged particles is captured as a conceptual necessity in the 
definitions of proton and negative charge. But this does not mean that conceptual 
and causal necessity should be equated. The fact that they coincide in the case of 
the proton is a consequence of the successful accommodation of our physical 
vocabulary to the causal structure of the world. 
 
 
When one transports this association of causation and conceptual necessity to the 
social realm and then adds the intuitively appealing but ill-understood idea of 
relational powers constituted by internal relations, one arrives at the conclusion 
that much of the causal relations within the social world can be deduced from the 
meanings of our social roles and attributes. A teacher simply could not be a 
teacher without being in a certain relation to other people (students) and this 
relation confers upon him or her the causal power to educate. In Reorienting 
Economics, Lawson expresses optimism about the extent of our commonsensical 
access to the causal structure of the social world: “if we simply transfer the 
successful social-theoretical practices of our everyday lives into our social-
theoretical research activities, albeit, perhaps, with the aim of pursuing these 
practices in more systematic, explicitly formulated, critically examined and self-
reflexive ways, there is every reason to anticipate a more successful performance 
of our discipline.” (Lawson 2003: 108) The possibility of causal knowledge 
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concerning the social realm can apparently be transcendentally deduced from the 
indisputable fact that we can, more or less, get along with each other and act 
intentionally within the framework of our social institutions, and this requires 
valid causal knowledge about the social realm. 
 
 
Lawson’s optimism is remarkable given that the very idea of social science arises 
from the acknowledgement that the social world is not in fact transparent to its 
inhabitants (e.g., Guala 2010). Not only are we incapable of figuring out all the 
unintended consequences of our actions, not to speak of the actions of others, but 
much of our working knowledge of the basis of social interaction and the very 
drivers of our own behavior may well be seriously mistaken. A growing body of 
empirical evidence suggests that we are in fact not that good at pre-theoretically 
perceiving what makes us and our society tick (see, e.g., Uhlmann et al. 2008 and 
the references therein). Uncritical reliance on our commonsense understanding of 
the social world in general, and armchair theorizing based on semantic intuitions 
about the meanings of social attributes in particular, are a recipe for creating 
illusions of scientific understanding (Ylikoski 2009). In the case of economics, 
this danger is all the more pressing, since many key economic concepts seem, at 
first glance, to be what Mäki has called commonsensibles (Mäki 1996; see Hands 
in this volume and Guala in this volume). We certainly entertain all kinds of folk-
theories about the central entities of economics, and we have a rudimentary 
understanding of them which is sufficient for our individual daily lives. But 
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scientific economics steps in precisely where common sense becomes insufficient 
and very often misleading. Our commonsensical causal understanding of 
economic matters is ill-equipped for dealing with large aggregates, multiple 
interdependent markets, and strategic interaction. Therefore transcendental 
deduction cannot establish the happy conclusion that the possibility of correct 
causal knowledge follows necessarily from the fact that we can, more or less, get 
along just fine with our individual economic lives. 
 
5. GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT MECHANISTIC REASONING 
 
While Lawson recognizes the comparative nature of explanatory inference, he 
fails to see the close connection between modeling, which he despises, and ‘how 
possibly–reasoning’, which he rightly recognizes as an important element in 
explanatory reasoning. We will now argue that formal modeling is really an 
advanced version of ‘how possibly-reasoning’ where the formalization on the one 
hand forces the modeler to be explicit about his or her assumptions, and on the 
other hand makes it possible to study systematically what kinds of consequences 
assumptions have and how these consequences change when the assumptions are 
changed or new elements are taken into consideration.  
 
 
Although Lawson’s trust in our commonsense understanding of the social realm 
goes too far, it is undeniable that much of the theorizing about social mechanisms 
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in economics also starts from folk-psychological assumptions about individual 
behavior and commonsensical assumptions about the social institutions within 
which that behavior takes place. This is also true of the market for lemons. The 
“model” of the mechanism linking information asymmetry to the surprising price 
difference is based on commonsensical assumptions concerning the beliefs and 
desires of the market participants and of the general forms of their possible social 
interaction. What is groundbreaking about Akerlof’s toy model is the reasoning of 
how these simple and by all accounts well-established causal platitudes can jointly 
lead to a surprising outcome. And as Lawson surmises (2009a: 416), the 
mathematical toy model in Akerlof’s paper is to all intents and purposes quite 
superfluous for this inference task.  
 
 
But not all mechanistic theorizing is as ingeniously simple as that of Akerlof’s. 
Natural language is an unreliable tool for figuring out the consequences of our 
assumptions, when those assumptions imply complex interaction and have to 
satisfy mutual consistency conditions. Our working memory is too limited, pre-
theoretical concepts too vague and the sequential nature of natural language too 
ill-suited for reliable mechanistic reasoning. Mechanistic storytelling in natural 
language may often provoke a powerful sense of understanding, but this feeling 
may all too easily be mistaken. Lawson claims that formal modeling of 
mechanisms is always redundant, since in order to be (legitimately) confident 
about the causal interpretation of the model, we already have to possess the 
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required knowledge about the modeled mechanism (see especially Lawson 
2009d).   But this is simply false. The mechanistic consequences of our causal 
assumptions are not immediately transparent. Mechanistic theorizing can provide 
us with hypotheses about explanatory dependencies only when we can 
unequivocally deduce that if some causal assumption were different, then the end 
result or conclusion would be different as well. This kind of reasoning cannot 
always be reliably carried out in natural language and certainly not just within our 
heads. A formal representation of the assumptions and well-defined inference 
rules are often necessary in making these kinds of inferences possible. In order to 
keep our mechanistic reasoning straight, we may have to rely on mathematical 
models or computer simulation. This is the main function of theoretical models 
and it is quite different from the asymptotical approximation of a detailed 
photograph-like representation of economic phenomena.   
 
 
For Lawson, realism seems to entail that proper science should aim at a unique, 
maximally detailed, and completely true description of its target phenomena. In 
the philosophy of science, this stance has become known as the Perfect Model 
Model (Teller 2001). This model of modeling does not allow false elements a 
cognitive role, just as Lawson does not allow literally false isolations. Only 
abstraction, in the sense of temporarily omitting some features of the target 
phenomena from the theoretical focus, is epistemically acceptable (see Lawson 
1997, chp 16). According to Lawson, theoretical isolations in Mäki’s sense are a 
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poor guide to economic truths since their use presupposes that the isolated powers 
combine “mechanistically” in economic reality. But the social realm is not 
atomistic and such recombination of theoretically isolated powers is not usually 
possible (Lawson 1997: 131-133.) 
 
 
There is much truth in Lawson’s concern about the difficulties in combining the 
theoretical insights from isolative causal models into a valid causal understanding 
of actual economic phenomena. Economic phenomena are more than mere 
aggregates of isolated causal capacities. Nevertheless, it is also noteworthy how 
little there is in the way of positive suggestions for better realistic alternatives in 
Lawson’s writings. Naturally considerations of tractability create limitations as to 
what can be done, but it is quite absurd to give up the whole strategy of formal 
model building because of these limitations. After all, there are even more severe 
limitations for tractability and extrapolation for the kind of theoretical practice 
Lawson supports. A more natural reaction to these limitations is to look for more 
flexible modeling tools, like agent-based simulation, rather than giving up the idea 
of piecemeal modeling of complex phenomena. Our final point is that Lawson has 
failed to appreciate the way in which the very possibility of isolation itself can be 
seen as a heuristically useful, albeit a literally false, ontological assumption. We 
take our cue from William Wimsatt’s (2007) discussion on reductive research 
heuristics. According to Wimsatt, complexity, such as that of economic 
phenomena, cannot be approached as a totality. It is futile to start with as rich and 
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accurate a surface description of the phenomenon of interest as possible and then 
simply try to “understand” how it works. The point of making unrealistic, 
simplifying, and reductionistic models is precisely to provide a starting point, 
something we can meaningfully relate to the complex system being investigated, 
and then start learning about the system by seeing how and why the simplifying 
model fails. We cannot start by simply abstracting from the clutter of economic 
reality, because mere abstraction cannot get us to the underlying mechanisms. We 
are better off by first treating the constituents of social realm as if they were 
isolatable, and then learn about their causal interaction and interconnectedness by 
seeing how our atomistic, isolative models fail, and then move on to building 
better ones. This is the strategy of model-based science (Weisberg 2007) and any 
realist critic of economics should first understand its rationale. Such an 
understanding can be found, for example, in Uskali Mäki’s philosophy of 
economics. 
 
6. TWO WAYS TO PRACTICE CRITICAL REALISM 
 
In this paper we have documented how the isolation of Lawson’s critical realism 
from the developments in philosophy of science has hampered its ability to 
contribute to the improvement of the epistemic practices of modern economics. 
But as is well known, Lawson’s critical realism is not the only realist game in 
town. In this section we will consider whether Mäki’s version of realism fares 
better in critical engagement with the science of economics.  
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Mäki (2011a) recently introduced the notion of authentic critical realism (ACR) to 
describe his own position. While the polemical title is new, it does not reflect any 
change in his philosophical position. From the beginning, Mäki has been part of 
the Finnish tradition of scientific realism (see Niiniluoto 1999, see also Tuomela 
1985) that has emphasized the critical dimension of realism. Mäki summarizes the 
key ideas of ACR as follows: 
 
  
ensuring a reliable epistemic access to the world is enormously difficult; 
cognition is the joint work by subject and object in which the subject 
contributes heavily; the endeavour is radically fallible; doing good science 
requires critical reflection of various epistemic hazards, identifying and 
safeguarding against sources of possible and ever-present biases and 
errors. This is an epistemological rather than ontological doctrine. It 
focuses on the complexity and proneness to hard-to-identify error of the 
scientific endeavour.   
           (Mäki 2011a, 10)  
 
 
While Mäki suggests that this makes ACR rather different from Bhaskarian 
critical realism, both Bhaskar and Lawson could agree with the sentiment of this 
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passage. Both of them accept fallibilism and neither of them would deny the 
complexity of the social world. In our view, the crucial differences between 
Bhaskarian critical realism advocated by Lawson and ACR advocated by Mäki 
are not to be found in any specific ontological or epistemological positions taken 
by Mäki and Lawson. While there are plenty of such differences – albeit some of 
them surprisingly small – they are not decisive. The crucial differences concern 
philosophical methodology and rhetorical strategy. While these differences 
deserve a more systematic study, in the following we will only observe two 
pertinent differences. 
 
  
Let us start with their characterization of realism. Lawson’s critical realism is an 
example of what Uskali Mäki and Päivi Oinas (2004) have characterized as a 
thick conception of realism. It consists of a package of philosophical views about 
causation, social ontology and scientific methodology that are added to the core 
ideas of realism. According to Mäki and Oinas, the critical realist bundle suffers 
from a double problem. On the one hand, the bundle seems to be rather weak in 
its realist credentials, as it does not employ some conceptual resources often 
associated with scientific realism. On the other hand, the bundle also appears 
somewhat arbitrary, as there is no obvious reason to assume that a scientific 
realist should accept precisely the suggested views about causation, social 
ontology and methodology. 
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While someone might suggest that this line of criticism just reflects the fact that 
Mäki and Lawson have some disagreements about the details of the realist 
doctrine, in our view this line of argumentation springs from a deeper 
philosophical difference. For Lawson, realism refers to a comprehensive system 
of thought, while for Mäki it refers to a more limited set of philosophical theses 
about the mind-independent existence of the world, the concept of truth, and the 
attainability of truths about the world (Mäki & Oinas 2004: 1757-1763). As a 
consequence, what for Lawson is a systematic theory of science, is for Mäki a 
more or less arbitrary collection of independent philosophical claims that should 
be separately argued for. Notice that Mäki does not deny that for a realism to have 
bite on the epistemic practices of economics, it needs to be supplemented with 
more specific ontological, epistemological and methodological views. The crucial 
thing for him is that it is a requirement of the philosophical methodology that the 
modular nature of the realist worldview is recognized in one’s argumentation. For 
him, it is essential that the audience understands that there are many ways to be a 
realist and that everything depends on the details of the philosophical 
argumentation. In contrast, it seems to us that for Lawson, it is more important to 
get the big picture right than to attend to contingencies of his philosophical 
position. 
 
 
This methdological difference has some important rhetorical consequences. 
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Lawson’s philosophical strategy makes it possible for him to present critical 
realism as an ontological position that has great methodological relevance and to 
suggest that it is a general solution for economists’ philosophical problems. The 
drawback is that this strategy skips some crucial argumentative steps and ignores 
many options for alternative philosophical positions. It is not accidental that 
among Lawson’s supporters there are very few professional philosophers. In 
contrast, Mäki’s approach has much more respect within this particular segment 
of the audience. However the nuances of Mäki’s position make his task of 
accessing non-philosophical audiences harder. His wish to make justice to the 
complexity of philosophical issues (together with his philosophical personality) 
leads him to introduce a great deal of distinctions with the consequence that there 
is the danger of the relevant message getting lost in the details. Second, his 
persistence in focusing on the core issues of realism – that he is not providing a 
broader realist bundle of philosophical positions – may simply make his work 
seem less relevant for the social scientists. 
 
 
The second crucial methodological difference concerns the application of the 
principle of charity in making sense of modern economics. Lawson’s description 
of mainstream economics is quite straightforward and even stereotypical. From 
the point of view of his theory-driven account of the failures of neoclassical 
economics (Lawson 2003: Ch. 10), the employment of the principle of charity 
does not seem to be very important. In contrast, Mäki finds even the economic 
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mainstream much less unified and is hopeful that economics might become more 
receptive for philosophical intervention (Mäki 2002). The same basic charity 
characterizes Mäki’s approach to the modeling methodology applied in 
economics. While Lawson is eager to get rid of it on the basis of its apparent 
inability to produce much understanding of the economic phenomena, Mäki has 
emphasized the importance of understanding how this methodology actually 
works and what kind of understanding its users are after. In fact, most of Mäki’s 
work on economic methodology has been concerned with precisely these issues 
(see Lehtinen in this volume). In his view, only after understanding what 
economists are attempting to do can we engage in evaluation and criticism of 
these practices. Notice that this methodological difference does not imply that 
Mäki is ultimately any less critical of the mainstream economics. It is just that the 
principle of charity requires withholding judgment until the ideas under 
consideration are properly understood. 
 
 
Again, this methodological difference has some rhetorical consequences. While it 
is natural for Mäki to attempt to influence the mainstream economics from the 
inside – consider his engagement with Friedman’s essay (Mäki 2009) – there is 
not much point for Lawson to engage in such a strategy. Given Lawson’s views 
on the mainstream – a consequence of his philosophical methodology – it is much 
more prudent for him to ignore the mainstream segment of the economics 
audience completely. In fact, he has quite successfully championed himself as the 
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philosophical critic of the neoclassical economics. While his audience – many 
heterodox economists and other social scientists – do not necessarily buy his 
complete package of critical realism, they have found him a useful ally in the 
advocacy of a more pluralistic economics. Mäki’s strategy is a bit more difficult 
as he is facing two challenges that Lawson does not face. First, he has to find a 
right balance of criticism and defense of the mainstream in order to appeal both to 
mainstream and non-mainstream audiences. This is quite tricky to do. Second, in 
order to get a chance to influence the mainstream from the inside, he has to 
convince economists that he has captured the essence of their methodology. This 
is even more difficult to do as most economists are not used to philosophically 
reflect on their work and there is in fact much variation in economists’ self-
understanding of their activities. 
 
 
Ultimately the fate of any kind of critical realism about economics depends on the 
amount and quality of improvement it brings in our understanding of economic 
phenomena. In this paper we have argued that Lawson’s proposed alternative to 
the model-based strategy has some serious shortcomings. Nor does it provide 
many useful ideas for the improvement of economics as it is currently practiced. 
If one misses the key elements of model-based strategy of doing science by 
adopting the ideals of the so-called Perfect Model Model, it is not to be expected 
that this specific version of realism would provide many constructive ideas for 
those sciences that do employ this strategy. 
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The intellectual strategy of Mäki’s critical realism has been much more successful 
in this respect. While the details of his account are still under discussion (see the 
contributions to this volume), he has had an important role in providing new 
philosophical resources to debates about the nature of economic knowledge. 
However, there is also something that Mäki could learn from Lawson. While 
Mäki has done an admirable job in adapting standard scientific realism to 
economics (Mäki 2011a; 2011b), one does not get very far methodologically with 
only the core ideas of realism. While ideas about ontology and truth are important 
elements in a comprehensive account of economic knowledge, they are not the 
ones that would have a lasting effect on the practice of economics. They are tools 
for a meta-commentary about economics, not for doing economics.  
 
 
To have a lasting critical impact one has to include other elements – like ideas 
about explanation, evidence, and epistemic standards – to one’s realist package. 
Of course, this creates a problem for any aspiring critical realist: how to acquire 
credible ideas about these issues? If our diagnosis of shortcomings of Lawson’s 
ideas is right, one should not trust one’s (Aristotelian) intuitions. If one takes 
seriously the modular nature of the realist worldview, the idea of deriving them 
from one’s fundamental ontology is a non-starter. And if one wishes to keep up 
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the idea that there could be something seriously wrong with economics, one 
cannot just reconstruct them from the sayings and practices of economists. 
 
  
In our view, a promising strategy for any realist with critical ambitions is that of 
raising the issue of compatibility of economics with the other sciences. While the 
old ideas of the unity of science are dead – and deserve to stay that way – there is 
still plenty of room for dialectical strategies that require economics – or any other 
discipline – to justify its methodological and theoretical idiosyncrasies. For 
example, if what economists think about explanation does not square with 
explanatory practices of physical, biological, and behavioral sciences, we have a 
promising leverage point. It makes possible to raise the issue of idiosyncrasy in a 
credible manner, but it also provides tenable positive ideas about how explanation 
should be conceived. 
 
 
What we are suggesting is that philosophy of economics cannot be just 
philosophy of economic science – a credible philosophy of science should also 
consider how different fields and disciplines are related to each other. While the 
current situation in which we have philosophies of special sciences – physics, 
biology, economics, etc. – is preferable to earlier time when we only had highly 
abstract general philosophy of science, one should remember that a single-minded 
specialization in only one discipline might have some unintended consequences. 
  579	  
Sciences as a whole provide plenty of resources for critical discourse that aims to 
improve epistemic practices within a single discipline. Of course, this approach is 
demanding, one has to get right not only economics, but also a set of other 
sciences. However, this is not an extra burden to a scientific realist. 
 
NOTES 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i	  We would like to thank Caterina Marchionni and Tuukka Kaidesoja for their 
critical and realistic comments.	  
ii	  This is not a novel observation. For example, Alan Garfinkel (1981) and 
Germund Hesslow (1983) have already provided accounts of the role of 
anomalous differences in causal inquiry. Later Peter Lipton (2004) has presented 
similar ideas. 
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